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Abstract—Correlated sources are present in communication
systems where protocols ensure that there is some predetermined
information for sources. Here correlated sources across an
eavesdropped channel that incorporate a heterogeneous encoding
scheme and their effect on the information leakage when some
channel information and a source have been wiretapped is in-
vestigated. The information leakage bounds for the Slepian-Wolf
scenario are provided. Thereafter, the Shannon cipher system
approach is presented. Further, an implementation method using
a matrix partition approach is described.
I. INTRODUCTION
Practical communication systems make use of correlated
sources, for example smart grid meters. Each smart grid meter
for a particular grid conforms to certain protocols and this
means that certain information (e.g. date, area, etc.) in the
header files will be the same for various meters. From the
receiver’s (or an eavesdropper’s) perspective, it appears as
common information shared between the meters. This is there-
fore pre-existing or known information for an eavesdropper.
Thus, correlated sources are common in systems transmitting
information, e.g. smart grid meter systems. This implies that
the theory used for correlated sources may also be applied to
this type of system.
Correlated source coding incorporates the lossless com-
pression of two or more correlated data streams. Correlated
sources have the ability to decrease the bandwidth required to
transmit and receive messages because a compressed form of
the original message is sent across the communication links
instead of the original message. A compressed message has
more information per bit, and therefore has a higher entropy
because the transmitted information is more unpredictable. The
unpredictability of the compressed message is also beneficial
for the information security.
In practical communication systems links are prone to
eavesdropping and as such this work incorporates wiretapped
channels, more specifically the wiretap channel II. In work by
Aggarwal et al. [1] it is seen that an eavesdropper can be active
and can erase/modify bits. They develop a perfect secrecy
model for this scenario. The eavesdropper that we investigate
is a passive wiretapper, who cannot modify information. The
mathematical model for this wiretap channel has been given
by Rouayheb et al. [2], and can be explained as follows:
the channel between a transmitter and receiver is error-free
and can transmit n symbols from which µ of them can be
observed by the eavesdropper and the maximum secure rate
can be shown to equal n−µ symbols. The wiretap channel II
was described by Ozarow and Wyner [3] with a coset coding
scheme. This wiretap channel can even be looked at from
a Gaussian approach. A variation of this Gaussian wiretap
channel has been investigated by Mitrpant et al. [4]. In this
work we use an information theory approach and provide a
link to coding theory. There has been work done on wiretap
channels for a coding approach. The first was done by Wei [5]
who presented the generalized Hamming weight to describe
the minimum uncertainty that an eavesdropper has access to.
Thereafter characteristics on this channel were introduced by
Luo et al. [6]. The characteristics focused on were those
pertaining to Hamming weights and Hamming distances in
order to determine the equivocation of a wiretapper. Thereafter,
the security aspect of wiretap networks has been looked at
in various ways by Cheng et al. [7], and Cai and Yeung
[8], emphasizing that it is of concern to secure this type of
channels.
The difference between the original wiretap channel and the
wiretap channel II is that the latter is error free. In an inter-
esting application of the wiretap channel and wiretap channel
of type II, Dai et al. [9] presented a model that incorporates
compromised encoded bits and wiretapped bits from a noisy
channel. The concept of a noiseless transmission gives rise to
an ideal situation in terms of noise when analyzing the model.
Here, we consider a scenario where an eavesdropper has access
to more than just the bits from the communication links. Luo
et al. [6], in some previous work, have described a similar sort
of adversary as more powerful. In addition to the eavesdropped
bits from the communication links, the eavesdropper also has
access to some data symbols from the two remaining sources.
In other previous work [10], the information leakage for two
correlated sources when some channel information from the
communication links had been wiretapped was investigated.
Intuitively from this work, it is seen that there is indeed more
information gained by the more powerful eavesdropper, not
just in terms of the source symbols but in terms of the source
being considered, which results from the fact that the sources
are correlated. This makes it easier for the eavesdropper to
determine the transmitted message and information about the
source of concern.
This extra information that the eavesdropper has access to
can be considered as side information to assist with decoding.
ar
X
iv
:1
50
1.
04
47
8v
2 
 [c
s.I
T]
  2
3 J
an
 20
15
2Villard and Piantanida [11] have also looked at correlated
sources and wiretap networks: A source sends information to
the receiver and an eavesdropper has access to information
correlated to the source, which is used as side information.
There is a second encoder that sends a compressed version
of its own correlation observation of the source privately to
the receiver. Here, the authors show that the use of correla-
tion decreases the required communication rate and increases
secrecy. Villard et al. [12] have explored this side information
concept further where security using side information at the
receiver and eavesdropper is investigated. Side information is
generally used to assist the decoder to determine the transmit-
ted message. An earlier work involving side information was
done by Yang et al. [13]. The concept can be considered to
be generalized in that the side information could represent a
source. It is an interesting problem when one source is more
important and Hayashi and Yamamoto [14] have considered it
in another scheme with two sources, where only one source is
secure against wiretappers and the other must be transmitted to
a legitimate receiver. They develop a security criterion based
on the number of correct guesses of a wiretapper to attain
a message. In this paper the source data symbols may be
seen as side information to the eavesdropper, which is further
explained in Section II.
Shannon’s secrecy model is an interesting avenue for this
work. Previous work [10] has looked at a model for Shannon’s
cipher system when there is wiretapping at the channel only.
Merhav [15] investigated similarly, for a model using the addi-
tional parameters of the distortion of the source reconstruction
at the legitimate receiver, the bandwidth expansion factor of
the coded channels, and the average transmission cost.
In the model presented herein two correlated sources and
a third source having correlation to one other source, which
may also be wiretapped is considered. The paper is arranged
in nine sections. Section II puts forth a description of the
model and Section III presents the information leakage quan-
tification for this model. The information leakage is a new
concept developed and quantifies how much of information
the adversary/eavesdropper has access to. The proofs for the
information leakage quantification are presented in Section
IV. In Section V, the Shannon cipher system approach is
presented, where channel and key rates for perfect secrecy
are determined. In Section VI, the practical investigation is
detailed. Thereafter, similar models are discussed in Section
VII and the paper is concluded in Section VIII and the
Appendix that details the proofs for the theorems developed
for the Shannon cipher approach are contained in Section IX.
II. MODEL
The independent, identically distributed (i.i.d.) sources X ,
Y and Z are mutually correlated random variables, depicted
in Figure 1. The alphabet sets for sources X , Y and Z are
represented by X and Y and Z respectively. Assume that XK
and Y K are encoded into two channel information portions
represented by their common and private information portions.
We can write TX = (VCX , VX) and TY = (VCY , VY )
where TX and TY are the channel information of X and Y
respectively. The Venn diagram in Figure 2 easily illustrates
this idea. Each source is composed of K bits, and for source
ZK , µ of these symbols are considered as the predetermined
information and is leaked to the wiretapper (µ ≤ K).
XKZK
Zµ
XˆK , Yˆ K
Decoder
k
Wiretapper
Y K
Encoder Encoder
TX TY
Figure 1. Correlated source coding for heterogeneous encoding scheme with
X and Y transmitting compressed information
VX VY
X Y
Z
VCX VCY
Figure 2. The relation between private and common information
This encoding scheme, as specified in [16] reaches the
Slepian-Wolf bound. Here, the length of TX and TY is not
fixed, as it depends on the encoding process and nature of the
Slepian-Wolf codes.
The correlated sources X , Y and Z transmit messages (in
the form of some channel information) to the receiver along the
channel. The decoder determines X and Y only after receiving
TX and TY .
The eavesdropper has access to either the common or private
portions given by TX and TY and the eavesdropped source
information Zµ. The effect is that the eavesdropper has access
to some compressed information (that is transmitted across the
communication link after encoding) and some uncompressed
information (i.e. the source Z’s data symbols). It is valuable
to determine how much of information this eavesdropper has
access to when wiretapping the private or common information
portions (this is described in the next section).
Here, for XK and Y K typical set encoding and decoding
is used. We are able to determine bin indices for the typical
sequence from the indices passed over the communication
channel. When common or private information from the
syndromes are wiretapped it gives an indication of which
row/column in the specific look up table the sequence is
contained within. The encoding and decoding for X and Y has
been described in detail in previous work [16]. The decoding
probabilities follow.
From the Venn diagram we see that the private information
and common information produced by each source should
3contain almost no redundancy. Here, VCX , VX , VY , VCY are
asymptotically disjoint, which ensures that there is almost no
redundant information sent to the decoder.
In previous work [10], we have considered the common
information that VCX and VCY represent, which was found
to be I(X;Y ). Here, we begin to explore the nature of codes
when there are three correlated sources. We first define the
prototype code: For any 0 ≥ 0 and sufficiently large K,
there exits a code WCX = FCX(XK), WCY = FCY (Y K),
X̂K , Ŷ K , ẐK , where WX ∈ IMX , WY ∈ IMY , WCX ∈
IMCX and WCY ∈ IMCY for IMα , which is defined as
{0, 1, . . . ,Mα − 1}, that satisfies,
Pr{X̂K , Ŷ K 6= XK , Y K} ≤ 0 (1)
H(X|Y,Z)− 0 ≤ 1
K
H(WX) ≤ 1
K
logMX
≤ H(X|Y,Z) + 0 (2)
H(Y |X,Z)− 0 ≤ 1
K
H(WY ) ≤ 1
K
logMY
≤ H(Y |X) + 0 (3)
I(X;Y )− 0 ≤ 1
K
log[H(WCX) +H(WCY )]
≤ I(X;Y ) + 0 (4)
1
K
H(XK |VY ) ≥ H(X)− 0 (5)
1
K
H(Y K |VX) ≥ H(Y )− 0 (6)
1
K
H(ZK |VY ) ≥ H(Z)− 0 (7)
We can see that (1) - (4) mean
H(X,Y )− 30 ≤ 1
K
(H(WX) +H(WCX) +H(WY )
+ H(WCY )) ≤ H(X,Y ) + 30 (8)
Hence from (1), (8) and the ordinary source coding theorem,
(WX , WY , WCX and WCY ) have almost no redundancy for
sufficiently small 0 ≥ 0. Equations (1) - (8) have been proven
in [10] for two sources.
This model can cater for a scenario where a particular
source, say Y needs to be more secure than X (possibly
because of eavesdropping on the Y channel only); we would
need to secure the information that could be compromised.
A masking approach to achieve this is described in previous
work [16].
III. INFORMATION LEAKAGE USING SLEPIAN-WOLF
APPROACH
In order to determine the security of the system, a measure
for the amount of information leaked has been developed.
The obtained information and total uncertainty are used to
determine the leaked information. Information leakage is indi-
cated using LPQ. Here P indicates the set of sources for which
information leakage is being quantified. Further, Q indicates
the transmitted sequence that has been wiretapped.
The information leakage bound for the cases where informa-
tion from all three links are wiretapped is investigated. There
are two cases considered:
Case 1: Leakage on Y when TY , TX , Zµ are wiretapped.
Case 2: Leakage on X when TY , TX , Zµ are wiretapped.
The information leakage for these cases is as follows:
LY
K
TY ,TX ,Zµ ≤
1
K
[H(VY ) +H(VCY )−H(Y K)
+ I(TY ;Y
K) + I(TX ;Y
K)
+ I(TY ;TX |Y K) + I(Y K ;Zµ) + I(TY ;Zµ|Y K)
+ I(TX ;Z
µ|Y K , TY )− I(TX ;TY )− I(TX ;Zµ)
− I(TY ;Zµ|TX)] + δ (9)
LX
K
TY ,TX ,Zµ ≤
1
K
[H(VX) +H(VCX)−H(XK)
+ I(TY ;X
K) + I(XK ;TX)
+ I(TY ;TX |XK) + I(XK ;Zµ) + I(TY ;Zµ|XK)
+ I(TX ;Z
µ|XK , TY )− I(TX ;TY )− I(Zµ;TX)
− I(TY ;Zµ|TX)] + δ (10)
Here, TX and TY are the compressed sequences and in
terms of the information quantity they include either the
private or common portion. Thus, we can see the above bound
as a generalised result for wiretapping X’s or Y ’s links, when
the source Z is leaked. The portion Zµ could be leaked from
the private or common portion of Z; this is therefore also a
generalised representation for the leaked portion for Z.
This is interesting because this case deals with correlated
sources and as such intuitively it is known that there is some
information that may be leaked by an alternate source. The
common information component between all sources is the
maximum information that can be leaked by another source.
For this case, the common information VCX and VCY can
thus consist of added protection to reduce the amount of
information leaked.
IV. PROOF OF INFORMATION LEAKAGE BOUNDS
This bound developed in (9) is proven below.
Proof for (9): First, H(Y K |TY , TX , Zµ) is determined,
as to perform the information leakage calculation we need to
4find H(Y )−H(Y |TY , TX , Zµ)
1
K
H(Y K |TY , TX , Zµ)
=
1
K
[H(Y K , TY , TX , Z
µ)−H(TY , TX , Zµ)]
(a)
=
1
K
[H(Y K) +H(TY |Y K) +H(TX |TY , Y K)
+ H(Zµ|Y K , TY , TX)− (H(TY ) +H(TX |TY )
+ H(Zµ|TY , TX))]
(b)
=
1
K
[H(Y K) + (H(TY )− I(TY ;Y K)) + (H(TX
− I(Y K ;TX)− I(TY ;TX |Y K)) + (H(Zµ)− I(Y K ;Zµ)
− I(TY ;Zµ|Y K)− I(TX ;Zµ|Y K , TY ))−H(TY )
− (H(TX)− I(TX ;TY ))− (H(Zµ)
− I(Zµ;TX)− I(TY ;Zµ|TX))]
(c)
=
1
K
[H(Y K) +H(TY )− I(TY ;Y K) +H(TX)
− I(Y K ;TX))− I(TY ;TX |Y K) +H(Zµ)− I(Y K ;Zµ)
− I(TY ;Zµ|Y K)− I(TX ;Zµ|Y K , TY )−H(TY )
− H(TX) + I(TX ;TY )−H(Zµ) + I(Zµ;TX)
+ I(TY ;Z
µ|TX)]
=
1
K
[H(Y K)− I(TY ;Y K)− I(Y K ;TX)
− I(TY ;TX |Y K)− I(Y K ;Zµ)− I(TY ;Zµ|Y K)
− I(TX ;Zµ|Y K , TY ) + I(TX ;TY )
+ I(Zµ;TX) + I(TY ;Z
µ|TX)] (11)
where (a) results from the chain rule expansion for
H(Y, TY , TX , Z
µ) and H(TY , TX , Zµ) and (b) results from
the property that the conditional entropy is the same as the
mutual information subtracted from the total uncertainty, i.e.
H(X|Y ) = H(X)− I(X;Y ). Here, (c) is arithmetic, where
the terms H(TY ), H(TX) and H(Zµ) cancel.
The information leakage is thus:
LY
K
TY ,TX ,Zµ = H(Y )−
1
K
H(Y K |TY , TX , Zµ)
≤ 1
K
[H(VY ) +H(VCY )−H(Y K)
+ I(TY ;Y
K) + I(Y K ;TX) + I(TY ;TX |Y K)
+ I(Y K ;Zµ) + I(TY ;Z
µ|Y K)
+ I(TX ;Z
µ|Y K , TY )− (I(TX ;TY )
+ I(Zµ;TX) + I(TY ;Z
µ|TX))]− δ
=
1
K
[H(VY ) +H(VCY )−H(Y K)
+ I(TY ;Y
K) + I(Y K ;TX) + I(TY ;TX |Y K)
+ I(Y K ;Zµ) + I(TY ;Z
µ|Y K)
+ I(TX ;Z
µ|Y K , TY )− I(TX ;TY )
− I(Zµ;TX)− I(TY ;Zµ|TX)] + δ (12)
which proves (9).
Proof for (10):
1
K
H(XK |TY , TX , Zµ)
=
1
K
[H(XK , TY , TX , Z
µ)−H(TY , TX , Zµ)]
(d)
=
1
K
[H(XK) +H(TY |XK) +H(TX |TY , XK)
+ H(Zµ|XK , TY , TX)− (H(TY ) +H(TX |TY )
+ H(Zµ|TY , TX))]
(e)
=
1
K
[H(XK) + (H(TY )− I(TY ;XK))
+ (H(TX − I(XK ;TX)− I(TY ;TX |XK)) + (H(Zµ)
− I(XK ;Zµ)− I(TY ;Zµ|XK)− I(TX ;Zµ|XK , TY ))
− H(TY )− (H(TX)− I(TX ;TY ))− (H(Zµ)
− I(Zµ;TX)− I(TY ;Zµ|TX))]
(f)
=
1
K
[H(X) +H(TY )− I(TY ;XK) +H(TX)
− I(XK ;TX))− I(TY ;TX |XK) +H(Zµ)− I(XK ;Zµ)
− I(TY ;Zµ|XK)− I(TX ;Zµ|XK , TY )−H(TY )
− H(TX) + I(TX ;TY )−H(Zµ) + I(Zµ;TX)
+ I(TY ;Z
µ|TX)]
=
1
K
[H(XK)− I(TY ;XK)− I(XK ;TX)
− I(TY ;TX |XK)− I(XK ;Zµ)− I(TY ;Zµ|XK)
− I(TX ;Zµ|XK , TY ) + I(TX ;TY )
+ I(Zµ;TX) + I(TY ;Z
µ|TX)] (13)
where (d) results from the chain rule expansion for
H(X,TY , TX , Z
µ) and H(TY , TX , Zµ) and (e) results from
the property that the conditional entropy is the same as the
mutual information subtracted from the total uncertainty, i.e.
H(X|Y ) = H(X)− I(X;Y ). Here, (f) is arithmetic, where
the terms H(TY ), H(TX) and H(Zµ) cancel.
The information leakage is thus:
LXTY ,TX ,Zµ = H(X
K)− 1
K
H(XK |TY , TX , Zµ)
≤ 1
K
[H(VX) +H(VCX)−H(XK)
+ I(TY ;X
K) + I(XK ;TX)
+ I(TY ;TX |XK) + I(XK ;Zµ) + I(TY ;Zµ|XK)
+ I(TX ;Z
µ|XK , TY )− (I(TX ;TY )
+ I(Zµ;TX) + I(TY ;Z
µ|TX))]− δ
=
1
K
[I(TY ;X
K) + I(XK ;TX)
+ I(TY ;TX |XK) + I(XK ;Zµ)
+ +I(TY ;Z
µ|XK) + I(TX ;Zµ|XK , TY )
− I(TX ;TY )− I(Zµ;TX)
− I(TY ;Zµ|TX)] + δ (14)
which proves (10).
This section shows the information leakage for when various
portions of the channel information and some source data
symbols are leaked. It is evident that the eavesdropper has
more information about a particular source as shown in (12)
5and (14) than if only one or two links transmitting compressed
information were wiretapped. This can be drawn from a
comparison of some previous work [10]. The interesting cases
explored for (9) and (10) demonstrate that the source Z
contributes to leakage for X and Y ; this is due to the common
information shared between them.
Equations (9) and (10) indicate that the information leakage
is upper bounded by the common information portions indi-
cated. The information leakage in (9) and (10) can be reduced
if the common information portions are secured. Equations (9)
and (10) can be verified using the Venn diagram in Figure 2.
V. SHANNON CIPHER APPROACH
Here, we discuss Shannon’s cipher system for three corre-
lated sources (depicted in Figure 3). The two source outputs
are i.i.d random variables X and Y , taking on values in the
finite sets X and Y . Both the transmitter and receiver have
access to the key, a random variable, independent of XK and
Y K and taking values in IMk = {0, 1, 2, . . . ,Mk − 1}. The
sources XK and Y K compute the ciphertexts W1 and W2,
which are the result of specific encryption functions on the
plaintext from X and Y respectively. The encryption functions
are invertible, thus knowing W1 and the key, kX for X then
X can be retrieved. The key for Y is represented as kY .
The mutual information between the plaintext and ciphertext
should be small so that the wiretapper cannot gain much in-
formation about the plaintext. For perfect secrecy, this mutual
information should be zero, then the length of the key should
be at least the length of the plaintext.
XKZK
Zµ
XˆK , Yˆ K
Decoder
k
Wiretapper
Y K
Encoder Encoder
TX TY
kX , kY
kX , kY
Figure 3. Shannon cipher system for three correlated sources
The encoder functions for X and Y , (EX and EY respec-
tively) are given as:
EX : XK × IMkX → IM ′X = {0, 1, . . . ,M ′X − 1}
IM ′CX = {0, 1, . . . ,M ′CX − 1}(15)
EY : YK × IMkY → IM ′Y = {0, 1, . . . ,M ′Y − 1}
IM ′CY = {0, 1, . . . ,M ′CY − 1}(16)
The decoder is defined as:
DXY : (IM ′X , IM ′Y , IM ′CX , IM ′CY ) × IMkX , IMkY
→ XK × YK (17)
The encoder and decoder mappings are below:
W1 = FEX (X
K ,WkX) (18)
W2 = FEY (Y
K ,WkY ) (19)
X̂K = FDX (W1,W2,WkX) (20)
Ŷ K = FDY (W1,W2,WkY ) (21)
or
(X̂K , Ŷ K) = FDXY (W1,W2,WkX ,WkY ) (22)
The following conditions should be satisfied for cases 1- 4:
1
K
logMX ≤ RX +  (23)
1
K
logMY ≤ RY +  (24)
1
K
logMkX ≤ RkX +  (25)
1
K
logMkY ≤ RkY +  (26)
Pr{X̂K 6= XK} ≤  (27)
Pr{Ŷ K 6= Y K} ≤  (28)
1
K
H(XK |W1) ≤ hX +  (29)
1
K
H(Y K |W2) ≤ hY +  (30)
1
K
H(XK , Y K |W1,W2) ≤ hXY +  (31)
where RX is the rate of source X’s channel and RY is
the rate of source Y ’s channel. Here, (RkX , RkY ) is the rate
of the key channel when allocating a key to X and Y . The
security level for X and Y are measured by the total and
individual uncertainties, (hX , hY ) and hXY respectively.
The cases 1 - 3 that are considered are as follows:
Case 1: When (W1,W2, Zµ) is leaked and (XK , Y K) needs
to be kept secret. The security level of concern is represented
by 1KH(X
K , Y K |W1,W2, Zµ).
Case 2: When (W1,W2, Zµ) is leaked and (XK , Y K) needs
to be kept secret. The security level of concern is represented
6by ( 1KH(X
K |W1,W2, Zµ), 1KH(Y K |W1,W2, Zµ)).
Case 3: When (W1,W2, Zµ) is leaked and Y K needs to be
kept secret.The security level of concern is represented by
1
KH(Y
K |W1,W2, Zµ).
The admissible rate region for each case is defined as
follows:
Definition 1a: (RX , RY , RkX , RkY , hXY ) is admissible
for case 1 if there exists a code (FEX , FDXY ) and (FEY ,
FDXY ) such that (23) - (28) and (31) hold for any → 0 and
sufficiently large K.
Definition 1b: (RX , RY , RkX , RkY , hX , hY ) is admissible
for case 2 if there exists a code (FEX , FDXY ) and (FEY ,
FDXY ) such that (23) - (30) hold for any  → 0 and
sufficiently large K.
Definition 1c: (RX , RY , RkX , RkY , hY ) is admissible for
case 3 if there exists a code (FEY , FDXY ) such that (23) -
(28) and (30) hold for any → 0 and sufficiently large K.
Definition 2: The admissible rate regions of Rj for case j
are defined as:
R1(hXY ) = {(RX , RY , RkX , RkY ) :
(RX , RY , RkX , RkY , hXY ) is admissible for case 1} (32)
R2(hX , hY ) = {(RX , RY , RkX , RkY ) :
(RX , RY , RkX , RkY , hX , hY ) is admissible for case 2} (33)
R3(hY ) = {(RX , RY , RkX , RkY ) :
(RX , RY , RkX , RkY , hY ) is admissible for case 3} (34)
Theorems for these regions have been developed:
Theorem 1: For 0 ≤ hXY ≤ H(X,Y ) − αCX − αCY +
I(X;Y ;Z),
R1(hXY ) = {(RX , RY , RkX , RkY ) :
RX ≥ H(X|Y ),
RY ≥ H(Y |X),
RX +RY ≥ H(X,Y )
RkX +RkY ≥ hXY } (35)
Theorem 2: For 0 ≤ hX ≤ H(X)− αCX and
0 ≤ hY ≤ H(Y )− αCY
R2(hY ) = {(RX , RY , RkX , RkY ) :
RX ≥ H(X|Y ),
RY ≥ H(Y |X),
RX +RY ≥ H(X,Y )
RkX +RkY ≥ max(hX , hY )} (36)
where R1 and R2 are the regions for cases 1 and 2
respectively. Here, αCX and αCY are the common portions
(i.e. the correlated information) of the i.i.d source Z (for
I(X;Z) and I(Y ;Z) respectively) that are contained in Zµ
per symbol. When hX = 0 then case 3 can be reduced to that
depicted in (36). Hence, Corollary 1 follows:
Corollary 1: For 0 ≤ hY ≤ H(Y )− αCY ,
R3(hY ) = R2(0, hY )
The security levels, which are measured by the total and
individual uncertainties hXY and (hX , hY ) respectively give
an indication of the level of uncertainty in knowing certain
information. When the uncertainty increases then less infor-
mation is known to an eavesdropper and there is a higher level
of security. The proofs of Theorems 1 and 2 are detailed in
the appendix.
VI. INFORMATION LEAKAGE USING MATRIX PARTITIONS
In this section the aim is to determine the equivocation
(uncertainty) in retrieving the message from the transmit-
ted channel information. We follow the convention used by
Stankovic et al. [17] to present an example together with
a method incorporating generator matrix ranks put forth by
Luo et al. [6] and determine the equivocation. The Hamming
distances are represented as follows: dH(XK , Y K) ≤ 1 and
dH(Y
K , ZK) ≤ 1. It is noted that there is some sort of
correlation between X and Z due to the Hamming distance
relations between (XK , Y K) and (Y K , ZK).
The following generator matrix G is used:
G =

1 0 0 0 1 0 1
0 1 0 0 1 1 0
0 0 1 0 1 1 1
0 0 0 1 0 1 1

The matrix takes the form: G = [IkPT ] and here Ik is the
identity matrix of order k and PT is made up of two 2 × 3
matrices in this case.
Suppose the messages to send across the channels for X
and Y are given by: x = [a1 v1 q1] = [10 11 001] and y =
[u2 a2 q2] = [10 11 011].
There is compression along X’s and Y ’s channel. As per
the matrix partition method the syndrome for X and Y is
comprised of:
TX =
[
vT1
PT1 a
T
1 ⊕ qT1
]
TY =
[
uT2
PT2 a
T
2 ⊕ qT2
]
where PT1 is the G matrix transpose of rows 1-2 and columns
5-7 and PT2 is the G matrix transpose of rows 3-4 and columns
5-7. The generator matrices used by X and Y to achieve these
syndromes are GX and GY respectively.
GX =

0 0 1 0 1
0 0 1 1 0
1 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 1

7GY =

1 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0
0 0 1 1 1
0 0 0 1 1
0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 1

This results in syndromes of [1 1 1 0 0] for X and
[1 0 1 1 1] for Y .
Here, the equivocation for these cases can be found using
the G matrix specified above and a sub matrix of G. As
per Luo et al. [6], the equivocation is given by: 4Y |TY =
rank(G)− rank(GY ), where 4Y |TY is the equivocation on Y
given TY .
Next, the information leakage for each of the following
cases is analyzed:
• The equivocation on (XK , Y K) when (TX , TY ) is leaked
• The equivocation on (XK , Y K) when TX is leaked
• The equivocation on (XK , Y K) when TY is leaked
In order to show the most representative results for each
of the cases the scenarios contributing to the minimum and
maximum information leakage have been considered.
Before the information leakage method is described certain
variables are introduced. Here, µTX and µTY represent the
number of wiretapped bits from TX and TY respectively. The
length of the information bits from each syndrome is repre-
sented as lXi and l
Y
i for X
K and Y K respectively. The length
of parity bits with respect to XK or Y K is denoted as lp, and
the following can be developed: lXi + l
Y
i + 2lp is the overall
length of TX and TY . Hence we have: 0 ≤ µTX ≤ lXi + lp
and 0 ≤ µTY ≤ lYi + lp.
Note that the leakage is determined using a combination
of the information and parity bits and the parity matrix H
rank. The H matrix rank is used to determine how much
of information is leaked from the wiretapped bits, when
the columns corresponding to the wiretapped bits have been
removed. Let H ′ denote the H matrix with the wiretapped
columns removed.
The case for the leakage on (XK , Y K) when (TX , TY )
is leaked is now considered. Initially we consider when the
maximum leakage is reached. When µTX ≤ lXi and µTY ≤ lYi ,
the maximum leakage is µTX + µTY + rank(H) − rank(H ′).
This considers when the information bits (namely v1 and u2)
have been leaked only. Next, if µTX > l
X
i and µTY > l
Y
i is
considered. For this case min(µTX − lXi , µTY − lYi ) parity bits
can be from the corresponding positions in PT1 a
T
1 ⊕ qT1 and
PT2 a
T
2 ⊕ qT2 . Therefore, the maximum leakage is lXi + lYi +
µTX + min(µTX − lXi , µTY − lYi ) + rank(H) − rank(H ′). If
µTX > l
X
i and µTY ≤ lYi the maximum leakage is µTY +
lXi + rank(H) − rank(H ′); if µTX ≤ lXi and µTY > lYi , the
maximum leakage is µTX+l
Y
i +rank(H)−rank(H ′). Now we
consider when the minimum leakage is reached. When µTX ≤
lp and µTY ≤ lp, the minimum leakage is max(0, µTX+µTY −
lp) + rank(H) − rank(H ′). This considers when the parity
bits (namely PT1 a
T
1 ⊕ qT1 and PT2 aT2 ⊕ qT2 ) have been leaked
only. Otherwise, the minimum leakage is µTX + µTY − lp +
rank(H) − rank(H ′). For the numerical example considered
the information leakage as represented above is depicted in
Figure 4.
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Figure 4. The information leakage on (XK , Y K) when (TX , TY ) has been
wiretapped
Next the information leakage for the second and third cases
are determined. The leakage for these cases reach the same
limit for the minimum and maximum cases of information
leakage, however the information leakage peak occurs at dif-
ferent points depending on which bits (information or parity)
are leaked first. The leakage for the second and third cases
respectively are as follows: LX
K ,Y K
TX
= lXi and L
XK ,Y K
TY
= lYi .
Using the numerical example for this section, the graphical
representation is in Figure 5. The maximum case depicted
is when the information bits are initially wiretapped and the
minimum case is where the parity bits are initially wiretapped.
Now the information leakage on (XK , Y K) when µ bits
of source Z is leaked is considered, which is done in two
steps. First, since dH(Y K , ZK) ≤ 1, if there are 0 < µ ≤ K
bits (µ = 0 is considered earlier in this section), the number of
possible sequences including repeated sequences is 2K−µ(K+
1). However, there are 2K−µ different sequences repeated
K − µ + 1 times and there are µ2K−µ different sequences
that possibly occur once. Second, from every possible Y K ,
there are eight possible sequences for XK with identical
possibilities. Therefore, the information leakage due to Zµ
with respect to XK and Y K is detailed in (37).
LX
K ,Y K
Zµ = H(X
K , Y K) + K−µ+1K+1 log2
K−µ+1
2K−µ(K+1)
+µ2K−µ 1
2K−µ(K+1) log2
1
2K−µ(K+1) −H(XK |Y K) (37)
where H(XK , Y K) = 10, H(XK |Y K) = 3 and K = 7.
The information leakage represented in (37) may be used
in the cases explored in this section to separately determine
the information leakage of Zµ on XK and Y K .
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Figure 5. The information leakage on (XK , Y K) when TX or TY has
been wiretapped
In this example certain bits have more equivocation than
others and as such which bits are wiretapped plays a role in
making the system vulnerable at different times. For instance,
following from the third case if only TY is wiretapped from
the parity bits then for the first 3 bits there is no information
leakage due to TY as the wiretapper would have encountered
the masked bits. The information leakage occurs after the third
bit, when u2 is wiretapped. This therefore shows an upper
and lower bound on the uncertainty, where the upper bound
is given when bits u2 is leaked first and the lower bound
is given when the masked portion is first leaked. The parity
bits are masked and are thus more difficult to be leaked to an
adversary. Parity bits from both sources need to be wiretapped
and in the same positions in order to leak information. In
addition the Zµ bits also contribute to the information leakage
and the correlation between XK , Y K and Zµ plays a role in
determining the overall leakage.
In general, for a systematic code the columns that have a
weight of one would contribute one bit to the information
leakage entirely. With use of the matrix partition approach, if
the parity bits of both TX and TY are wiretapped (and these
bits are from the same columns in each generator matrix)
then for every two parity bits wiretapped there is one bit
of information leaked. The parity bits and the information
bits can also be used to solve the parity matrix to determine
the information leakage. If the wiretapped parity bits do not
belong to the same columns then there is no information
leakage at that point.
This section shows the equivocation for the model set forth
in Section II when various portions of the channel information
and some source data symbols from Z are leaked.
VII. DISCUSSION
The model presented herein is a more generalised approach
of Yamamoto’s [18] model. If we were to combine the commu-
nication links for X and Y into one link and wiretap from the
link only, we would have a similar situation as per Yamamoto’s
[18]. The information transmitted along the channels do not
have a fixed length as per Yamamoto’s [18] method. Here,
the channel information length may vary depending on the
encoding procedure and nature of Slepian-Wolf codes, which
is another feature of this model.
At first glance, Yamamoto’s model may seem to be a
generalisation of the Luo et al. [6] model, however Luo et
al. [6] incorporate a wiretapper at the source that introduces
a more powerful adversary. In our work, we use a similar
concept in that the information known to the eavesdropper
is µ source symbols for Z, which makes our model further
different to Yamamoto’s and Luo et al. [6].
The work by Yang et al. [13] uses the concept of side in-
formation to assist the decoder in determining the transmitted
message. The side information could be considered to be a
source and is related to this work when the side information is
considered as correlated information or when side information
assists in decoding. Similar work with side information that
incorporates wiretappers, by Villard and Piantanida [11] and
Villard et al. [12] may be generalized in the sense that side
information can be considered to be a source, however this new
model is distinguishable as channel information transmitted
across an error free channel can all be wiretapped. Another
point is that the Zµ wiretapped bits that the eavesdropper has
access to helps with reducing the uncertainty of determining
a message (as mentioned in Section I), can be considered as
side information to the eavesdropper.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Knowing which components contribute most to information
leakage aids in keeping the system more secure, as the required
terms can be additionally secured. Here, we analyze the
effect of an eavesdropper accessing a source and channel
information in terms of the information leakage. In Section
III the information leakage for the three correlated source
model with the more powerful adversary was quantified and
proven. It is seen that the common information portion and
the wiretapped source are the weaknesses when information
is leaked to the eavesdropper and will need to be secured
for decreasing the information leakage. The Shannon cipher
system approach has provided channel and key rates for perfect
secrecy. A method for practical implementation has also been
presented using a matrix partition approach.
IX. APPENDIX
This section initially proves the direct parts of Theorems 1
- 2 and thereafter the converse parts.
A. Direct parts
All the channel rates in the theorems above are in accor-
dance with Slepian-Wolf’s theorem, hence there is no need to
prove them. We construct a code based on the prototype code
(WX ,WY ,WCX ,WCY ) in Lemma 1. In order to include a
9key in the prototype code, WX is divided into two parts as
per the method used by Yamamoto [18]:
WX1 =WX mod MX1 ∈ IMX1 = {0, 1, 2, . . . ,MX1 − 1} (38)
WX2 =
WX −WX1
MX1
∈ IMX2 = {0, 1, 2, . . . ,MX2 − 1} (39)
where MX1 is a given integer and MX2 is the ceiling
of MX/MX1. The MX/MX1 is considered an integer for
simplicity, because the difference between the ceiling value
and the actual value can be ignored when K is sufficiently
large. In the same way, WY is divided:
WY 1 =WY mod MY 1 ∈ IMY 1 = {0, 1, 2, . . . ,MY 1 − 1} (40)
WY 2 =
WY −WY 1
MY 1
∈ IMY 2 = {0, 1, 2, . . . ,MY 2 − 1} (41)
The common information components WCX and WCY are
already portions and are not divided further. In this scenario
WCX +WCY lies between 0 and I(X;Y ). It can be repre-
sented by X and Y , X only or Y only. It can be shown that
when some of the codewords are wiretapped the uncertainties
of XK and Y K are bounded as follows:
1
K
H(XK |WX2,WY ) ≥ I(X;Y ) + 1
K
logMX1 − ′0 (42)
1
K
H(Y K |WX ,WY 2) ≥ I(X;Y ) + 1
K
logMY 1 − ′0 (43)
1
K
H(XK |WX ,WY 2) ≥ I(X;Y )− ′0 (44)
1
K
H(XK |WX ,WY ,WCY ) ≥ 1
K
logMCX − ′0 (45)
1
K
H(Y K |WX ,WY ,WCY ) ≥ 1
K
logMCX − ′0 (46)
1
K
H(XK |WY ,WCY ) ≥ H(X|Y ) + 1
K
logMCX − ′0 (47)
1
K
H(Y K |WY ,WCY ) ≥ 1
K
logMCX − ′0 (48)
1
µ
H(Zµ) ≥ αZ + αCX + αCY − I(X;Y ;Z)− ′0 (49)
where 
′
0 → 0 as 0 → 0. Here, we indicate the wiretapped
source symbols with the entropy in (49), where αCX and
αCY are the correlated portions of the i.i.d source Z that are
contained in Zµ per symbol and αZ is the private portion of
Z.
The proofs for (42) - (48) are the same as per Yamamoto’s
[18] proof in Lemma A1. The difference is that WCX , WCY ,
MCX and MCY are described as WC1, WC2, MC1 and
MC2 respectively by Yamamoto. Here, we consider that WCX
and WCY are represented by Yamamoto’s WC1 and WC2
respectively. In addition there are some more inequalities
considered here:
1
K
H(Y K |WX ,WCX ,WCY ,WY 2) ≥ 1
K
logMY 1
− ′0 (50)
1
K
H(Y K |WX ,WCX ,WCY ) ≥ 1
K
logMY 1
+
1
K
logMY 2 − ′0 (51)
1
K
H(XK |WX2,WCY ) ≥ 1
K
logMX1
+
1
K
logMCX − ′0 (52)
1
K
H(Y K |WX2,WCY ) ≥ 1
K
logMY 1
+
1
K
logMY 2 +
1
K
logMCX
− ′0 (53)
The inequalities (50) and (51) can be proved in the same
way as per Yamamoto’s [18] Lemma A2, and (52) and (53) can
be proved in the same way as per Yamamoto’s [18] Lemma
A1.
Proof of Theorem 1: Suppose that (RX , RY , RKX ,
RKY ) ∈ R1 for hXY ≤ H(X,Y )−αCX−αCY +I(X;Y ;Z).
Then, from (35)
RX ≥ H(XK |Y K)
RY ≥ H(Y K |XK)
RX +RY ≥ H(XK , Y K) (54)
RkX +RkY ≥ hXY (55)
Here the keys are uniform random numbers. For the first
case, consider the following: hXY > I(X;Y ).
MX1 = min(2KH(X|Y ), 2K(hXY −I(X;Y ))) (56)
MY 1 = 2
K(hXY −I(X;Y )) (57)
The codewords W1 and W2 and the key WkXand WkY are
now defined:
W1 = (WX1 ⊕WkY 1,WX2,WCX ⊕WkCX) (58)
W2 = (WY 1 ⊕WkY 1,WY 2,WCY ⊕WkCY ) (59)
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WkX =WkCX (60)
WkY = (WkY 1,WkCY ) (61)
where Wα ∈ IMα = {0, 1, . . . ,Mα − 1}. The wiretapper
will not know WX1, WCX WY 1 and WCY as these are
protected by keys.
In this case, RX , RY , RkX and RkY satisfy from (54) -
(61), that
1
K
logMX +
1
K
logMY =
1
K
(logMX1 + logMX2
+ logMCX) +
1
K
(logMY 1
+ logMY 2 + logMCY )
≤ H(X|Y ) +H(Y |X)
+ I(X;Y ) + 30
= H(X,Y ) + 30
≤ RX +RY + 30 (62)
1
K
[logMkX + logMkY ]
=
1
K
[logMCX + logMCY + logMY 1]
≤ I(X;Y ) + hXY − I(X;Y )− 0 (63)
= hXY − 0
≤ RkX +RkY − 0 (64)
where (82) results from (57).
The security levels thus result:
1
K
H(XK , Y K |W1,W2, Zµ)
=
1
K
H(XK , Y K |WX1 ⊕WkY 1,
WX2,WCX ⊕WkCX
WY 1 ⊕WkY 1,WY 2
WCY ⊕WkCY , Zµ)
≥ 1
K
H(XK , Y K |WX1,WX2,
WY 1 ⊕WkY 1,WY 2)− ′′0 (65)
=
1
K
H(XK , Y K |WX ,WY 2, Zµ)− ′′0
≥ I(X;Y ) + 1
K
logMY 1
− αCX − αCY + I(X;Y ;Z)− 2′0 − 
′′
0
= I(X;Y ) + hXY − I(X;Y )− αCX − αCY + I(X;Y ;Z)
− 2′0 − 
′′
0
= hXY − αCX − αCY + I(X;Y ;Z)− 2′0 − 
′′
0 (66)
where (65) holds because WCX and WCY are secured by
uniform random keys and the result of Yamamoto’s Lemma
A2.
Therefore (RX , RY , RkX , RkY , hXY ) is admissible from
(62) - (66).
Next the case where: hXY ≤ I(X;Y ) is considered. The
codewords and keys are now defined:
W1 = (WX1,WX2,WCX ⊕WkCX) (67)
W2 = (WY 1,WY 2,WCY ) (68)
WkX = (WkCX) (69)
MCX = 2
KhXY (70)
where Wα ∈ IMα = {0, 1, . . . ,Mα − 1}. The wiretapper
will not know the WX and WY that are secured with keys.
In this case, RX , RY , RkX and RkY satisfy that
1
K
[logMkX + logMkY ] =
1
K
logMCX
= hXY
≤ RkX +RkY (71)
where (71) results from (70).
The security level thus results:
1
K
H(XK , Y K |W1,W2, Zµ) = 1
K
H(XK , Y K |WX1,WX2,
WCX ⊕WkCX ,
WY 1,WY 2,WCY , Z
µ)
≥ 1
K
logMCX − αCX − αCY
+ I(X;Y ;Z)− ′0
= hXY − αCX − αCY + I(X;Y ;Z)
− ′0 (72)
where (109) holds from (70).
Therefore (RX , RY , RkX , RkY , hXY ) is admissible from
(67) - (109).
Theorem 2 proof:
In the same way, Suppose that (RX , RY , RkX , RkY ) ∈
R2 for hX ≤ H(X)− αCX − αCY + I(X;Y ;Z) and hY ≤
H(Y )−αCX−αCY +I(X;Y ;Z). Without loss of generality,
we assume that hX ≤ hY . Then, from (36)
RX ≥ H(XK |Y K)
RY ≥ H(Y K |XK)
RX +RY ≥ H(XK , Y K) (73)
RkX +RkY ≥ max(hX , hY ) (74)
Consider the following: hX > I(X;Y ).
MX1 = min(2KH(X|Y ), 2K(hY −I(X;Y ))) (75)
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MY 1 = 2
K(hY −I(X;Y )) (76)
The codeword W2 and the key WkY is now defined:
W1 = (WX1 ⊕WkY 1,WX2,WCX ⊕WkCX) (77)
W2 = (WY 1 ⊕WkY 1,WY 2,WCY ⊕WkCY ) (78)
WkX =WkCX (79)
WkY = (WkY 1,WkCY ) (80)
In this case, RX , RY , RkX and RkY satisfy from (75) -
(80), that
1
K
logMX +
1
K
logMY =
1
K
(logMX1 + logMX2
+ logMCX) +
1
K
(logMY 1
+ logMY 2 + logMCY )
≤ H(X|Y ) +H(Y |X)
+ I(X;Y ) + 30
= H(X,Y ) + 30
≤ RX +RY + 30 (81)
1
K
[logMkX + logMkY ]
=
1
K
[logMCX + logMCY + logMY 1]
≤ I(X;Y ) + hY − I(X;Y )− 0 (82)
= hY − 0
≤ RkX +RkY − 0 (83)
The security levels thus result:
1
K
H(XK |W1,W2, Zµ)
=
1
K
H(XK |WX1 ⊕WkY 1,WX2,WCX ⊕WkCX
WY 1 ⊕WkY 1,WY 2,WCY ⊕WkCY , Zµ)
≥ 1
K
H(XK , Y K |WX1 ⊕WkY 1,WX2,WY 1 ⊕WkY 1(84)
WY 2, Z
µ)− ′′0
=
1
K
H(XK , Y K |WX2,WY 2, Zµ)− ′′0
≥ I(X;Y ) + 1
K
logMX1 − αCX − αCY + I(X;Y ;Z)
(85)
− 2′0 − 
′′
0
= I(X;Y ) + min(2KH(X|Y ), 2hY −I(X;Y ))
− αCX − αCY + I(X;Y ;Z)− 2′0 − 
′′
0
≥ hY − αCX − αCY + I(X;Y ;Z)− 2′0 − 
′′
0
≥ hX (86)
1
K
H(Y K |W1,W2) = 1
K
H(Y K |WX1 ⊕WkX1,
WX2,WCX ⊕WkCX
WY 1 ⊕WkY 1,WY 2
WCY ⊕WkCY , Zµ)
≥ 1
K
logMY 1 + I(X;Y )− αCX
− αCY + I(X;Y ;Z)− ′0
= I(X;Y ) + min(H(X|Y ), hY − I(X;Y ))
− αCX − αCY + I(X;Y ;Z)− ′0 (87)
≥ hY − ′0 (88)
where (87) comes from (76).
Therefore (RX , RY , RkX , RkY , hX , hY ) is admissible
from (81) - (88).
Next the case where hX ≤ I(X;Y ) is considered. If hY >
I(X;Y ) the following results. The codewords W1 and W2
and their keys WkX and WkY are now defined:
W1 = (WX1,WX2,WCX ⊕WkCX) (89)
W2 = (WY 1 ⊕WkY 1,WY 2,WCY ⊕WkCY ) (90)
WkX = (WkCX) (91)
WkY = (WkY 1,WkCY ) (92)
MY 1 = 2
K(hY −I(X;Y )) (93)
where Wα ∈ IMα = {0, 1, . . . ,Mα − 1}. The wiretapper
will not know the WX and WY that are secured with keys.
In this case, RX , RY , RkX and RkY satisfy that
1
K
[logMkX + logMkY ] =
1
K
[logMCX + logMY 1 + logMCY ]
≤ I(X;Y ) + 1
K
logMY 1 − 0
= I(X;Y ) + hY − I(X;Y )− 0 (94)
= hY − 0
≤ RkX +RkY + 0 (95)
where (94) results from (93).
The security levels thus result:
1
K
H(XK |W1,W2)
=
1
K
H(XK |WX1,WX2
WCX ⊕WkCX ,WY 1 ⊕WkY 1,WY 2,
WCY ⊕WkCY , Zµ)
≥ I(X;Y )− αCX − αCY + I(X;Y ;Z)− ′0 (96)
= I(X;Y )− αCX − αCY + I(X;Y ;Z)− ′0 (97)
≥ hX − ′0 (98)
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where (97) results from (93).
1
K
H(Y K |W1,W2)
=
1
K
H(Y K |WX1,WX2
WCX ⊕WkCX ,WY 1 ⊕WkY 1,
WY 2,WCY ⊕WkCY , Zµ)
≥ I(X;Y ) + 1
K
logMY 1
− αCX − αCY + I(X;Y ;Z)− 0 (99)
= I(X;Y ) + hY − I(X;Y )
− αCX − αCY + I(X;Y ;Z)− ′0 (100)
≥ hY − ′0 (101)
where (100) holds from (93).
Next the case where hY ≤ I(X;Y ) is considered. The
codewords W1 and W2 and their keys WkX and WkY are
now defined:
W1 = (WX1,WX2,WCX ⊕WkCX) (102)
W2 = (WY 1,WY 2,WCY ) (103)
WkX =WkCX (104)
MCX = 2
KhY (105)
where Wα ∈ IMα = {0, 1, . . . ,Mα − 1}. The wiretapper
will not know the WX and WY that are secured with keys.
In this case, RX , RY , RkX and RkY satisfy that
1
K
[logMkX + logMkY ] =
1
K
logMCX
= hY (106)
≤ RkX +RkY (107)
where (106) results from (105).
The security levels thus result:
1
K
H(XK |W1,W2, Zµ)
=
1
K
H(XK |WX1,WX2
WCX ⊕WkCX ,WY 1,WY 2,
WCY , Z
µ)
≥ hY − αCX − αCY + I(X;Y ;Z)− ′0 (108)
≥ hX − ′0 (109)
where (108) results from (105).
1
K
H(Y K |W1,W2, Zµ) = 1
K
H(Y K |WX1,WX2
WCX ⊕WkCX ,WY 1,WY 2,
WCY , Z
µ)
≥ 1
K
logMCY − αCX − αCY
+ I(X;Y ;Z)− ′0 (110)
≥ hY − αCX − αCY + I(X;Y ;Z)(111
where (110) holds from (105).
Therefore (RX , RY , RkX , RkY , hX , hY ) is admissible for
min(hX , hY ) (102) - (111).
B. Converse parts
From Slepian-Wolf’s theorem we know that the channel rate
must satisfy RX ≥ H(X|Y ), RY ≥ H(Y |X) and RX+RY ≥
H(X,Y ) to achieve a low error probability when decoding.
Hence, only the key rates are considered in this subsection.
Converse part of Theorem 1:
RkX ≥ 1
K
logMkX − 
≥ 1
K
H(WkX)− 
≥ 1
K
H(WkX |W )− 
=
1
K
[H(WkX)− I(WkX ;W )]− 
=
1
K
H(WkX |XK , Y K ,W ) + I(WkX ;W )
+ I(WkX ;X|Y,W ) + I(X,Y,WkX |W )
+ I(Y,WkX |X,W )− I(WkX ;W )− 
=
1
K
[H(XK , Y K |W )−H(XK , Y K |W,WkX)]− 
≥ hXY − 1
K
H(XK , Y K |W,WkX)−  (112)
= hXY − 1
K
H(Y K |XK)− αCX − αCY
+ I(X;Y ;Z)− − ′′0
≥ hXY − αCX − αCY + I(X;Y ;Z)− − ′′0 (113)
where W = (W1,W2, Zµ) are the wiretapped portions,
(112) results from equation (31). Here, we consider the ex-
tremes of H(Y |X) and H(WY ) in order to determine the
limit for RkX . When this quantity is minimum then we are
able to achieve the maximum bound of hXY .
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RkY ≥ 1
K
logMkY − 
≥ 1
K
H(WkY )− 
≥ 1
K
H(WkY |W )− 
=
1
K
[H(WkY )− I(WkY ;W )− 
=
1
K
H(WkY |X,Y,W ) + I(WkY ;W )
+ I(WkY ;X|Y,W ) + I(X,Y,WkY |W )
+ I(Y,WkY |X,W )− I(WkY ;W )]− 
=
1
K
[H(XK , Y K |W )−H(XK , Y K |W,WkY )]− 
≥ hXY − 1
K
H(XK , Y K |W,WkY )−  (114)
= hXY − 1
K
H(XK |Y K)− αCX − αCY
+ I(X;Y ;Z)− − ′′0
≥ hXY − αCX − αCY + I(X;Y ;Z)− − ′′0 (115)
where (114) results from equation (31). Here, we consider
the extremes of H(VCX) in order to determine the limit for
RkY . When this quantity is minimum then we are able to
achieve the maximum bound of hXY .
Converse part of Theorem 2:
RkX ≥ 1
K
logMkX − 
≥ 1
K
H(WkX)− 
≥ 1
K
H(WkX |W )− 
=
1
K
[H(WkX)− I(WkX ;W )]− 
=
1
K
H((WkX |XK ,W ) + I(WkX ;W )
+ I(X,WkX |W )− I(WkX ;W )− 
≥ 1
K
I(XK ,WkX |W )− 
=
1
K
[H(XK |W )−H(XK |W,WkX)]− 
≥ hX −H(WCY )− αCX − αCY + I(X;Y ;Z)
− − ′′0 (116)
≥ hX − αCX − αCY + I(X;Y ;Z)− − ′′0 (117)
where W = (W1,W2, Zµ), (116) results from (29). The
consideration here is that H(Y K2) represents the preexisting
information known to an eavesdropper as an extreme case
scenario. Here, we can also consider the extremes of H(WCY )
in order to determine the limit for RkX . When this quantity
is minimum then we are able to achieve the maximum bound
of hX .
RkY ≥ 1
K
logMkY − 
≥ 1
K
H(WkY )− 
≥ 1
K
H(WkY |W )− 
=
1
K
[H(WkY )− I(WkY ;W )]− 
=
1
K
H(WkY |Y K ,W ) + I(WkY ;W )
+ I(X,WkY |W )− I(WkY ;W )− 
≥ 1
K
I(Y K ,WkY |W )− 
=
1
K
[H(Y K |W )−H(Y K |W,WkY )]− 
≥ hY −H(WCX)− αCX − αCY + I(X;Y ;Z)
− − ′′0 (118)
≥ hY − αCX − αCY + I(X;Y ;Z)− − ′′0 (119)
where (118) results from (30). The same consideration as
above for H(Zµ) is presented here. Here, we consider the
extremes of H(WCX) in order to determine the limit for RkY .
When this quantity is minimum then we are able to achieve
the maximum bound of hY .
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